Mass Surveillance: Accountability of the Personal Data Protection SErvice of Georgia
30 January, 2026
In 2025, Georgian authorities countered mass protests against the suspended EU integration not only with police violence, but also intensive high-resolution surveillance and facial recognition around protest sites.
Public Safety Command Centre - 112 video streams were processed with specialised software to identify participants, issuing heavy administrative penalties for minor acts. Rights Georgia lawyers reviewed dozens of cases, revealing systematic tracking of protesters, journalists, and monitors.
The report details the data cycle: targeted surveillance near assemblies, transfers from 112 to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) units, biometric matching via police databases, and prolonged retention of offence records. Biometric and special category data were handled without clear legal basis, judicial oversight; less intrusive options like on-site ID were ignored, with police programme rules remaining vague and disproportionate.
Critically, Georgia's Personal Data Protection Service (PDPS) showed deliberate inaction despite evident risks, conducting just one narrow inspection, declaring no violations without public details, and rejecting complaints via formal excuses.
Through legal analysis and case studies, the report deems Georgia's protest surveillance practices violations of privacy, expression, and assembly rights, warning that PDPS opacity lets MIA/112 persist—chilling activism.
